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Abstract
According to the existing literature, capital taxes should not be imposed in the presence of
optimal profit taxation in either unionised or competitive labour markets. We show that this
conclusion does not hold for an economy with both competitive and unionised sectors, where
the competitive wage rate provides the outside option for unionised workers. Even with non-
distortionary profit taxation it is optimal for such an economy to tax capital if the revenue
share of capital in the unionised sector is lower than the revenue share of capital in the
competitive sector. This is because taxing capital income reduces employment and lowers the
outside option of workers in the unionised sector with the latter effect being stronger. A
capital subsidy should be granted if the opposite relationship in terms of revenue shares holds.
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1. Introduction 
A fundamental result in the existing literature on capital income taxation is that small open 
economies should not levy source-based capital taxes if profit taxation is non-restricted. This 
result holds both in economies with competitive labour markets and economies with 
unionised labour markets. In the former case, the optimal tax structures includes profit and 
labour taxes only (cf. e.g. MacDougall 1960, Bucovetsky and Wilson 1991 and for a survey 
and some generalizations in dynamic general equilibrium models, cf. Atkeson, Chari and 
Kehoe 1999). In the latter case,  i.e. economies where the labour markets are imperfect due to 
e.g. bargaining power of the trade unions, a capital tax should not be employed as long as 
profits are high enough so that profit taxes can be used to finance public expenditures and a 
wage subsidy to correct for the labour market distortions (cf. Koskela and Schöb 2002a and 
Richter and Schneider 2001). If, however, profit taxation is restricted, it may become optimal 
to levy a positive capital tax to indirectly tax profits when labour markets are competitive 
(Huizinga and Nielsen 1997) and to moderate wages in the presence of labour market 
distortions by affecting the wage elasticity of labour demand via the capital tax (Koskela and 
Schöb 2002a). 
  It is tempting to conclude from these well-established results that when capital tax 
should not be levied in either an economy with a perfectly competitive or an imperfect labour 
market, it also should not be levied in economies with dual labour markets, where some 
sectors exhibit competitive labour markets and some unionised labour markets. This paper 
shows that this conclusion does not hold if these two types of labour markets are interrelated. 
If workers can be employed in both sectors, the competitive wage rate provides the outside 
option for unionised workers.
1 The marginal introduction of a capital tax does not distort the 
competitive labour market but reduces the outside option for workers in the unionised sector. 
This will moderate wage formation and boost employment and output in the unionised sector 
                                                 
1 For an analysis and discussion of the determinants of outside options, cf. Blanchard and Katz (1997). 2   Optimal Capital Taxation 
 
sector and improve social welfare – as long as the revenue share of capital in the unionised 
sector is lower than the cost (=revenue) share of capital in the competitive sector. A capital 
subsidy should be granted if the opposite relationship between the revenue shares holds.  
To focus on the interaction between the two different types of labour markets as 
clearly as possible we abstract from all other reasons that would require a non-zero capital tax 
rate. Thus, we (i) consider a small open economy that cannot influence the terms-of-trade, (ii) 
do not impose any restrictions on profit taxation so that the government can always rely on 
non-distortionary taxes and (iii) assume Cobb-Douglas production technologies to eliminate 
the effects, factor taxation can have on wage formations by altering the wage elasticity of 
labour demand. We proceed as follows: Section 2 outlines the model, while Section 3 derives 
the main results concerning the optimal structure of factor taxes in the presence of 
unrestricted non-distortionary profit taxation. The results are briefly discussed in the final 
Section 4. 
2. The model 
We consider a small open economy where there is one unionised sector and one competitive 
sector. The unionised sector produces the good 
u Y  that is sold on the world market at given 
world market price, which is normalized to unity. Output is produced with three inputs, 
capital 
u K , labour 
u L  and a third fixed input, whose income is considered as profit (or rent).
2 
To focus on the effects tax rate changes have on the cost side of production, we assume a 
constant profit share, i.e. the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale in capital 
and labour, 





1 ) 1 ( s u s u u K L Y . (1) 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, we can assume that the unionised sector generates profit due to monopolistic competition in the 
goods market, see e.g. Koskela and Schöb 2002b. 3   Optimal Capital Taxation 
 
where  1 > ε  describes the degree of decreasing returns to scale. Consequently,  ε 1  denotes 
the constant profit share, s the cost share of labour and  ε ε ) 1 ( − s  the revenue share of 
labour, respectively. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile between countries while labour 
is mobile only between sectors within the economy. The firm maximizes profits whereby it 
considers the gross factor prices r ~  and 
u w ~  as given. The gross interest rate r ~  consists of the 
net-of-tax interest rate and a source-based capital tax, i.e.  r t r r) 1 ( ~ + =  with  r t  denoting the 
uniform capital tax rate and r the (constant) world interest rate. The gross wage 
u w ~  is the net-
of-tax wage 




u w t w ) 1 ( ~ + = , with  w t  denoting the uniform labour tax rate.  
All N workers of the economy are represented by a trade union which maximizes its N 
members’ net-of-tax income. The net-of-tax wage rate of a working member in the unionised 
sector is 
u w . The outside option is to work in the competitive sector where the net-of-tax 
wage rate is given by 
c w . The objective function for the trade union can thus be expressed as: 
  ) (
0 u c u u L N w L w V − + = . (2) 
The wage rate is determined in a bargaining process between the trade union and the firm and 
the firm then unilaterally determines employment. This ‘right-to-manage’ approach represents 
the outcome of the bargaining by an asymmetric Nash bargaining. The fall-back position of 
the trade union is given by  N w V
c =
0 , i.e. if the negotiations break down, all members will 
work in the competitive labour sector. Assuming a small trade union, the outside option is 
constant for the trade union. The fall-back position of the firm is given by zero profits, i.e. 
0
0 = π . Using 
0 * V V V − ≡ , the Nash bargaining maximand can be written as 
 
β − βπ = Ω
1 V , (3) 
with β representing the relative bargaining power of the trade union. The first-order condition 
with respect to the net-of-tax wage rate is 
  0 ) 1 ( 0 =
π
π
















− ε β − + + − ε η + β
− ε β − + + − ε βη
=
) 1 )( 1 ( ) ) 1 ( )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 ( ) ) 1 ( (
~ ,
~ , , (5) 
where  1 > m  denotes the mark-up between the negotiated and competitive net-of-tax wage 
rates. It is constant as the definition of the wage elasticity of labour demand, 
) 1 ( 1 ~
~ ~ , ε − + − = ≡ η s L w Lw
u
w L , shows that 
u
w L ~ , η  is constant in the case of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function (1) (cf. Koskela and Schöb 2002b for an explicit derivation). The union-
nonunion wage differential can be written as  . 1 ) ( − = − = m w w w d
c c u  Hence, the net-of-tax 
wage 
u w  as well as the gross wage rate  ) 1 ( w
u t w + are proportional to the net-of-tax wage rate 
and the gross wage rate, respectively, in the competitive sector. 
  In the competitive sector, the representative firm produces the good 
c Y , which price is 
also normalized to unity, with capital 
c K  and labour 
c L  as the only two inputs. The 
production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, i.e. we 
have  
 
) 1 ( σ − σ
⋅ =
c c c K L Y , (6) 
where  σ  denotes the cost share of labour and  ) 1 ( σ −  the cost share of capital  in the 
competitive sector. Profits are thus zero in the competitive sector – a reason why this sector is 
not unionised. The price of capital is the same as in the unionised sector, while the net of-tax 
wage 
c w  is determined by the equilibrium condition in the competitive labour market. As all 
N workers in the economy prefer to work in the unionised sector as the net-of-tax wage rate 
exceeds the net-of-tax wage rate in the competitive labour market, the labour supply in the 
competitive sector is given by 
u L N −  and the net-of tax wage rate 
c w  is determined by the 
equilibrium condition  ) ~ , ~ ( ) ~ , ~ ( r w L N r w L
u u c c − = . 
  To determine the effects, factor taxes have on the-net-of-tax wage rate and the gross 
wage rate in the competitive sector, we make use of the cost function associated with the 
production function (6), that is 
c c c c c Y r w Y r w c Y r w C
σ σ σ σ σ σ
− − − − = =
1 1 ~ ~ ) 1 ( ) ~ , ~ ( ) , ~ , ~ (,  w h e r e  
) ~ , ~ ( r w c
c  denotes the constant unit cost of production and and thereby the marginal cost as 
well. As profit maximization requires  1 ) ~ , ~ ( = r w c
c , the impact of factor taxes on the net-of-tax 






































r . (8) 
A higher labour tax decreases the net-of-tax wage rate in the competitive sector such that the 
gross wage rate remains constant. A higher capital tax also reduces the net-of-tax wage rate 
such that both the marginal and unit cost remain constant. Naturally, the precise reduction 
depends on the cost shares of capital and labour. 
The government is assumed to require a fixed amount of tax revenues to finance the 
public good G. It can levy a profit tax  π t , a labour tax  r t  on wage income and a source-based 
tax on domestic capital input  r t , so that the government budget constraint is given by 
  G K K r t L w L w t t
c u
r
c c u u
w
u = + + + + π π ) ( ) ( . (9) 
To focus only on the efficiency aspects of the tax structure, we assume linear preferences and 
define the total surplus as the social welfare function (cf. Summers, Gruber and Vergara 
1993). The total surplus consists of the net-of-tax wage income equal to 
c c u u L w L w + , which 
accrues to workers, and the net-of-tax profit income 
u t π − π) 1 ( . As we hold G constant we 
suppress the term G in the total surplus function. Furthermore, the income from the domestic 
capital stock is also assumed to be constant and therefore is not explicitly considered in the 
welfare function either. All domestic profits go to domestic capitalists.
3 Hence, the social 
welfare function is given by 
 
u c c u u t L w L w S π − + + = π) 1 ( . (10) 
                                                 
3 For an analysis when foreigners receive a fraction of domestic profits, see Huizing and Nielsen (1997). 6   Optimal Capital Taxation 
 
3. The optimal tax structure 
The government is supposed to commit to the choice of an optimal tax structure by choosing 
tax rates so as to maximize social welfare (10) subject to the government’s budget constraint 
(9) and to wage and employment determination in both the unionised and competitive sector. 
Defining λ as the Lagrange multiplier for the government budget constraint, the first order 
condition for the profit tax  π t  is: 
 1 0 = λ ⇔ = λπ + π −
u u , (11) 
which shows that the optimal profit tax is non-distortionary. Moreover, and importantly, using 
the wage bargaining equation (5) for the unionised labour market, the first-order condition 
with respect to the labour tax rate  w t  can be written as follows 






t w w w w t w L N w t w mL , (12) 
where Λ describes the Lagrangian function. Utilizing equation (7) it can easily be shown that 
(12) also requires  1 = λ . Thus, the labour tax rate is as good as the profit tax to finance public 
expenditures efficiently, i.e. both taxes are non-distortionary in our framework. There are two 
reasons for this interesting finding. First, the labour tax rate in the competitive sector does 
only affect the net-of-tax wage of a fixed factor because the labour supply is exogenously 
determined by the unionised sector’s labour demand. Second, as the gross wage rate in the 
unionised sector is proportional to the gross wage rate in the competitive sector, the labour tax 
does not affect the outcome of the unionised sector either. This is an application of a well-
known neutrality result by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) (see p. 108) according to 
which labour taxes do not affect the outcome in the unionised sector if the outside option is 
proportional to the net-of-tax wage paid in the unionised sector. Proposition 1 summarizes. 
PROPOSITION 1 (LABOUR TAX RATE): A labour tax rate is non-distortionary in both the 
unionised and competitive sector, if the net-of-tax wage rate of the competitive sector 
represents the outside option of the trade union and total labour supply in the economy is 
fixed. 7   Optimal Capital Taxation 
 
Next we turn to the optimal capital tax rate and first notice that according to the existing 
literature, the capital tax rate should always be zero if non-distortionary taxes are available. 
We now ask whether this result holds if unionised and competitive labour markets both exist 
in an economy and are interrelated because the competitive wage rate is the outside option for 
the trade union that negotiates the wage rate in the unionised sector.  
Maximizing the Lagrangian with respect to  r t  when  1 = λ , gives the following 
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r . (13) 
(see Appendix 1 for a detailed derivation of Equation (13)). For a positive markp-up 
) 1 ( > m the denominator is always positive if  s − σ  is positive. Furthermore, and importantly, 
it can also be shown that the denominator is always positive under some additional but rather 
weak assumptions about the magnitude of m in the case when  s − σ  is negative: 
  0 ) (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
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m u  (14) 
(see Appendix 2). For instance, if the the profit share  ε 1  in the unionized sector is 10 %, i.e. 
10 = ε , any union-nonunion wage differential  1 − m  being less than 40 % provides a sufficient 
condition for a positive denominator. This assumption about the union-nonunion wage 
differential lies in conformity with empirical studies (for surveys, see Booth (1995) and Lewis 
(1986)). Thus the sign of the capital tax rate is given by the sign of the numerator. 
As we show in Appendix 1 (see Equation (A3)), the sign of the numerator is equal to 






r r +  that describes the employment effect of the capital tax rate in the 
unionised sector. We can see immediately that if the cost share of labour in the unionised 
sector s exceeds the cost share of labour in the competitive sector σ, the optimal tax structure 
requires a positive capital tax rate. As the numerator of (13) increases in the difference 
) ( s − σ  while the denominator decreases, the optimal tax structure is given by  8   Optimal Capital Taxation 
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0
s
tr . (15) 
In equation (14) the left-hand side is equal to the revenue share of labour, which is  ε − ε ) 1 (  
times the cost share of labour s, plus the profit share in the unionised sector  ε 1 . These are 
the two income shares in the unionised sector that affect social welfare. The right-hand side 
denotes the cost share of labour in the competitive sector.  This is the only income share in the 
competitive sector. Thus even in the presence of optimal non-distortionary profit tax the 
capital tax rate should be positive if the the welfare-relevant income component increases due 
to the introduction of a capital tax. 
To derive the intution for this result, we rewrite (15) as the condition for the sign of 
the capital tax rate in terms of the revenue share of capital: 
  ) 1 (
1 ) 1 (




























tr . (16) 
The optimal capital tax condition (15) can be summarized as 
PROPOSITION 2 (CAPITAL TAX RATE): The optimal tax structure in an economy, where are 
no restrictions on profit taxation, requires a positive capital tax rate if the revenue share of 
capital in the unionised sector is lower than the cost (= revenue) share of capital in the 
competitive sector. A capital subsidy should be granted if the opposite relationship holds. 
To provide an interpretation, notice first that the allocation of workers between sectors is 
determined in the unionised sector because the negotiated wage rate there determines labour 
demand in this sector. A capital tax reduces employment in the unionised sector because 
labour and capital are price complements, i.e.  . 0 ~ <
u
r L This effect is the larger, the larger the 
revenue share of capital is. In the competitive sector, the capital tax rate will lead to a fall in 
the net-of-tax wage rate so that marginal cost remains constant. The fall in the net-of-tax 
wage rate in the competitive sector is the larger, the larger the cost share of capital is in this 
sector. As this affects the outside option of the trade union, the effect countervails the direct 
effect of a change in the capital tax rate on employment in the unionised sector as it will lead 9   Optimal Capital Taxation 
 
trade unions to moderate wages. As Proposition 2 shows, the direct effect of the capital tax 
rate is dominated by the indirect wage moderation effect if the revenue share of capital in the 
unionised sector is lower than in the competitive sector. Hence, capital should be taxed. But if 
the direct effect dominates the indirect wage moderation effect, then capital should be 
subsidised. 
  Thus, Proposition 2 implies that if a capital tax can shift labour from the competitive 
to the unionised sector, social welfare will increase. The direct effect is obvious. Those 
workers who now find a job in the unionised sector are better offer as their wage increases. 
As we can apply the envelope theorem for the marginal introduction of the capital tax, we can 
see  that the income loss of workers in the competitive sector is compensated by the tax 
revenues from the marginal capital tax rate. In the unionised sector profits will rise by the 
same amount as tax revenues plus the income loss of incumbent workers. Thus the only 
welfare relevant effect is the income rise of those workers who change sectors. More 
precisely, the relationship between the social welfare and a marginal introduction of capital 









r ) 1 ( − =   (17) 
(see Appendix 3 for details). 
4. Concluding remarks 
The existing literature has demonstrated that in the presence of unrestricted profit taxes, 
source-based capital taxes should not be employed in either an economy with competitive 
labour market or an economy with unionised labour market. We have shown in this paper that 
this result does not carry over to the case of an economy where both types of labour markets 
exist and are interrelated so that the competitive wage rate determines the outside option for 
unionised workers and where there is a uniform labour tax rate in competitive and unionised 
labour markets. More precisely, we have shown in Proposition 2 that the relative revenue 10   Optimal Capital Taxation 
 
shares of capital in the unionised and competitive sector are essential in determining whether 
a capital tax or capital subsidy should be levied even in the presence of optimal profit 
taxation. 
Of course, our main result holds under strict assumptions about the technology in the 
two sectors. These strong assumptions were made because the aim of the paper was to isolate 
an effect that, to our knowledge, has not yet been discussed in the literature. By eliminating 
all effects that may affect the optimal capital tax rate and have already been identified in the 
literature, we were able to focus on an important effect capital taxes will have in an economy 
where parts of the labour markets are unionised while other parts are competitive. In such a 
dual labour markets economy, the capital tax rate normally affects the allocation of labour 
between sectors by changing the outside option in the unionised sector labour market via its 
impact on the wage rate in competitive labour market. It is desirable from a welfare point of 
view to employ more labour in the unionised sector as the marginal productivity of labour in 
the unionised sector is higher than in the competitive sector. Hence, the capital tax or the 
capital subsidy can be used to achieve that when other tax instruments fail to reallocate 
labour. This is the case with labour taxes when the technology in the unionised sector is 
Cobb-Douglas.  
Apart from the allocative effects, a welfare-improving introduction of either a capital 
tax or a capital subsidy, depending on the relative size of the revenue shares of capital, will 
have distributive consequences too. As we have identified the unionised sector as the one 
where profits are present and thus rent-sharing is possible, a welfare-improving introduction 
of a capital tax will hurt workers as their income goes down while benefiting the recipients of 
profit income if the revenue share of capital in the unionised sector is lower than in the 
competitive one. 11   Optimal Capital Taxation 
 
Appendix 1: Derivation of the optimal capital tax formula 
Maximizing social welfare (10) subject to government budget constraint (9) and wage and 
employment determination in the unionised and competitive sectors when the marginal cost of 
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Using the factor demand elasticities  ) 1 ( 1 ~ , ε − + − = η s
u
w L ,  ) 1 )( 1 ( ~ , ε − − = η s
u
r L , 
) 1 )( 1 ( 1 ~ , ε − − + − = η s
u
r K ,  ) 1 ( ~ , ε − = η s
u
w K  (for details cf. Koskela and Schöb 2002b), we can 
write: 
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where  εσ − + − ε ≡ 1 ) 1 ( s X . Thus we have  
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Factoring out with respect to  r t , we end up with equation 
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r tr . (A6) 
Substituting the definition of X into the first-order condition (A6) and reformulating gives 
equation (13) of the text. 
Appendix 2: Sufficient conditions for positive denominator of equation (13) 
Case A: 0 ) ( > − σ s . A sufficient condition for the posivite denominator is that the term 
[] σ − ε − ε ) 1 ( s m  is also positive so that  0 ) 1 ( > − ε − εσ s m . Using this condition, we have 
s m s s s m s m + − ε = − ε − ε > − ε − εσ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (.  A s   1 > m , it follows immediately that 
0 ) 1 ( > − ε − εσ s m . 
Case B:  0 ) ( < − σ s.  Let us first rewrite the denominator as follows 
   
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 − σ + ε + σ ε − εσ − εσ + σ −
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u u  
so that the sign of the denominator is the same as the sign of the terms in square brackets. 
Furthermore, applying  0 ) ( < − σ s , We can write: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( s s s s s m m s s s s s s m m s
L
N
u − σ + ε + σ ε − εσ − εσ + σ − > − σ + ε + σ ε − εσ − εσ + σ −
 
Thus, if the right-hand-side is positive, the denominator is also positive: 13   Optimal Capital Taxation 
 
  0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 2 2 > σ − ε + − σ εσ + − = − ε + σ ε − εσ − εσ + s s s m s s s s s s m m s  
For 0 ) ( < − σ s , we know that  0 ) ( < − σ σ s  and  0 ) ( > σ − s s . Thus, the denominator is 
positive in case B as long as 


















m  (A7) 
The term in brackets exceeds unity. Assuming that ε is a finite number, i.e. monopoly power 
does exist, a small difference between s and σ makes the term in brackets very large while a 
larger difference let the first term increase. 
Appendix 3: The social welfare effect of a marginal introduction of a capital 
tax 
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Using (8) and (A4), differentiating the budget constraint (9) with respect to the capital tax and 
applying  
  m w L rK m w r
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we can rewrite (A6), using  σ σ − = ) 1 (































which gives equation (16) of the text. 14   Optimal Capital Taxation 
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